STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

IN THE MATTER OF:
								Supreme Court No.     136349	
		
		ALYSSA ANN KEAST and			Court of Appeals No.	279820
		AMBER MARIE KEAST,			consolidated with 	279834
											279844
				Minors.						279845

								Lower Court No. 05-06388-NA
____________________________________/
Shon A. Cook (P51452)
Susan M. Franklin (P66047)
WILLIAMS, HUGHES & COOK, PLLC
Attorneys for Appellants Timothy & Barbara Atwood
120 W. Apple Ave.
P.O. Box 599
Muskegon, MI 49443-0599
Telephone: (231) 726-4857
___________________________________/

APPELLANTS TIMOTHY AND BARBARA ATWOOD’S
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS
											        Page

Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      3

Statement of Order Appealed From and Relief Sought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      4

Grounds for Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     5 

Statement of Questions Presented  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    6

Statement of Facts   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     7

Argument 

I.  	THE DECISION OF THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT IN DENYING TIMOTHY AND BARBARA ATWOOD CONSENT TO ADOPT THEIR MINOR GRANDCHILDREN WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN THAT IT WAS BASED ON INVALID AND INACCURATE INFORMATION.

	Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    13

	Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    13

II.	   THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER GRANDPARENT VISITATION PURSUANT TO MCL 722.27B.

	Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    23

	Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    23

III.	THE CIRCUIT COURT’S DECISION THAT GRANDPARENT VISITATION WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN WAS APPROPRIATE.

	Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    26

	Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    26

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     31

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
										                    Page
Ambs v Kalamazoo Co. Rd. Comm., 255 Mich App 637; 662 NW2d 424 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

Boyd v Civil Service Comm., 220 Mich App 226; 559 NW2d 342 (1996)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

Brinkley v Brinkley, 227 Mich App 23; 742 NW2d 629 (2007)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Herald Co., Inc v Eastern Michigan University Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463; 719 NW2d 19 
(2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   23
 
Institute of Basic Life Principles, Inc. v Watersmeet Twp, 217 Mich App 7; 551 NW2d 199 (1996)  24

K & K Const., Inc. v Department of Environmental Quality, 267 Mich App 523; 705 NW2d 365 
(2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

MacIntyre v Macintyre (On Remand), 267 Mich App 449; 705 NW2d 144 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28

Mason v Simmons, 267 Mich App 188, 194, 704 NW2d 104 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

In re Carpenter, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided 
December 3, 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

In re Cotton, 208 Mich App 180; 526NW2d 342 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 
    19

In re Miller, 433 Mich 331; 445 NW2d 161 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

STATUTES
MCL 400.203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
MCL 710.45  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10, 11, 
    13, 22
MCL 710.45(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
MCL 710.45(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
MCL 710.45(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
MCL 722.22(13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
MCL 722.22(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24 
MCL 722.26(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
MCL 722.27b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 23, 
     25, 26  
MCL 722.27b(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26, 30

COURT RULES
MCR 7.301(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
MCR 7.302(B)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
MCR 7.302(B)(3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
MCR 7.302(B)(5)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

STATEMENT OF ORDER APPEALED FROM
AND RELIEF SOUGHT

This Honorable Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to MCR 7.301(2).  Appellants Timothy and Barbara Atwood (the “Atwoods”) appeal from a February 5, 2008 opinion of the Court of Appeals (Exhibit 1) reversing the decision of the Newaygo County Circuit Court.  (Exhibit 2).  The Atwoods filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, which was denied on March 21, 2008.  (Exhibit 3).  
The Atwoods request that this Honorable Court reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the trial court.

GROUNDS FOR APPEAL

	As will be shown throughout this Application, there are multiple grounds for this appeal:
•	Pursuant to MCR 7.302(B)(2), the issue of custody of minor children is one of significant public interest, and the case is one by or against one of the state’s agencies or subdivisions (Department of Human Services);
•	Pursuant to MCR 7.302(B)(3), the issue involves legal principles of major significance to the state’s jurisprudence; and 
•	Pursuant to MCR 7.302(B)(5), the decision of the Court of Appeals is clearly erroneous, as the Court of Appeals substituted its Judgment of the facts for that of the Trial Court and material injustice will result if allowed to stand.

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.	DID THE CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINE THAT THE DECISION OF THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT IN DENYING TIMOTHY AND BARBARA ATWOOD CONSENT TO ADOPT THEIR MINOR GRANDCHILDREN WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN THAT IT WAS BASED ON INVALID AND INACCURATE INFORMATION?

		The Circuit Court says:	Yes

Appellants says:		Yes

Appellees say:			No 

The Court of Appeals says:	No

II.	DID THE CIRCUIT COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO GRANT GRANDPARENT VISITATION TO THE ATWOODS PURSUANT TO MCL 722.27b?

		The Circuit Court says:	Yes

Appellants says:		Yes

Appellees say:			No 

The Court of Appeals says:	No

III.	WAS THE CIRCUIT COURT’S DECISION THAT GRANDPARENT VISITATION WAS
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN APPROPRIATE?

		The Circuit Court says:	Yes

Appellants says:		Yes

Appellees say:			No 

The Court of Appeals says:	No

STATEMENT OF FACTS

	The subjects of this appeal are the placement and adoption of two minor children: Alyssa Ann Keast, DOB 1/22/2000 and Amber Marie Keast, DOB 8/18/2002.  (Exhibit 4 – Bethany Christian Services Report of 10/15/06).  The minor children are the children of Erica and Douglas Keast.  The children were first removed from the care of the mother in March of 2005, due to alleged drug dealing in the home and frequent drug use.  (Exhibit 4).
After the removal of the children from their mother in March of 2005, Appellee Department of Human Services (“DHS”) moved the minor children on several different occasions.  Id.  DHS removed the children from their mother in March of 2005 and placed with the maternal grandparents until June of 2005.  Id.  The placement with the maternal grandparents was done the same night as the children were removed from their mother.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 33).  The grandfather, Mr. Atwood, was actually called to come to the home of his daughter to pick up the children.  Id.  The children then remained with the grandparents, the Atwoods, from the date of removal until June of 2005.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 35).  The children were removed when DHS claimed that the grandparents had not followed the parent-agency agreement.  (Exhibit 4).  The grandparents, however, were not a party to the parent-agency agreement and had never been shown a copy.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 40; 5/24/07 Transcript, p. 113).  This was testified to by the DHS worker at the time of the placement and before the removal, Brian Vanderzalm.  (5/24/07 Transcript, p. 95).  
The children were removed because the mother took the children to the home of her boyfriend.  Initially, at the section 45 hearing, DHS claimed that the grandparents had allowed the mother unsupervised visitation.  However, testimony established that the grandparents had been told to allow the mother visitation whenever possible and that the mother was to take the children to church.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 41; Transcript 5/24/07 p. 95).  At the time of the removal, the mother lived on the property of the grandparents in a small apartment and was allowed unlimited contact with her children per the instructions of DHS.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 39-41).  Testimony at the section 45 hearing bore out the fact that the grandparents had complained to DHS that the boyfriend was having contact with the children and DHS did nothing about their concerns.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 43; 5/24/07 Transcript, p. 114).  On the date that the mother exposed the children to her boyfriend, the grandparents had no idea she was going to be around the boyfriend.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 42).  The removal of the children did not come until weeks after the mother took her children to see her boyfriend and after the boyfriend visited the children several times with the knowledge and consent of DHS.  In fact, later in the case, DHS not only allowed the boyfriend unlimited contact with the children, DHS actually placed the children back in the home of their mother, who was living with her boyfriend at the time.  (5/24/07 Transcript, p. 77-78).  Of course, the truth of this situation was never learned by the trial court until the time of the section 45 hearing, because the grandparents were never given an opportunity to tell the Court what happened.
The Atwoods requested a hearing before the Foster Care Review Board.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 44).  They were never given notice of the hearing.  Id.  Instead, after calling Lansing for several weeks to find out the status, the Atwoods learned that the hearing was going on without them.  Id.  The Atwoods rushed to the hearing that was nearly over by the time that they arrived.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 45). They did not have the benefit of an attorney or the opportunity to present any witnesses, as they were never given notice.  Id.    Their ability to refute the statements of DHS was limited to ten minutes of explanations without corroboration or representation.  DHS indicated that the Newaygo County Family Court Judge endorsed the decision to remove the children from the Atwoods.   The exhibit that was footnoted (Exhibit E) is the report of the foster care review board.  The report does not state anywhere that the Newaygo County Family Court Judge found any of the information to be true, or that he endorsed the position of the foster care review board.  There was never a hearing on this issue.  A report was given to the Court after the children were removed from the Atwoods and the Court having no refuted testimony adopted the report as an exhibit and relied upon DHS to be truthful in its assessment.  It was not until the section 45 hearing that the Court learned the entire truth of the situation.  
After breaking the placement with the grandparents, DHS then placed the children in the care of an uncle and broke that placement after one week, because the uncle could not handle the children.  (Exhibit 4).  In July of 2005, DHS moved the children to their first foster home for 10 days.  DHS then moved the children to their second foster home for another ten days.  Id.  In mid-July, DHS placed the children in their third foster home.  DHS put the children back into the care of their mother in December of 2005, who was living with her boyfriend at the time.  Id.  The mother had just been convicted of drug crimes, as had the boyfriend.  Further, at the time of the placement, the mother had just tested positive for marijuana (this was never told to the Judge in the neglect case until the time of the Section 45 hearing in this matter).  The placement lasted a week, before the mother tried to kill herself in front of the children when the mother overdosed on drugs.  Id.  DHS then placed the children back into the foster care system in December of 2005.  They have been in the same home since that time.  Id.
The parental rights of Douglas Keast were terminated on or about February 22, 2006.  (Exhibit 5).  Erica Keast’s parental rights were terminated on or about May 10, 2006.  (Exhibit 6).  The children were then placed under the supervision of DHS, pursuant to the Orders of Termination.  Id.
	Appellants Timothy and Barbara Atwood (the “Atwoods”), the parents of Erica Keast, applied to adopt their grandchildren as soon as they learned of the termination of parental rights, in June of 2006.  (5/23/07 Transcript, p. 50).  At the time the Atwoods applied for adoption, they were the only prospective adoptive parents.  As part of the assessment process, Mr. Atwood underwent drug screening and a drug assessment.  Bethany Christian Services, which had contracted to provide services to the Michigan Children’s Institute, issued a written report suggesting that consent to adopt should be withheld.  (Exhibit 7 – Bethany Christian Services report dated 10/26/06).  This report was then re-typed and adopted by the Department of Human Services (DHS) and MCI, without any further elaboration.  (Exhibit 8).  The Atwoods appealed the decision as arbitrary and capricious to the Newaygo County Circuit Court pursuant to MCL 710.45.
	A hearing was held on February 7, 2007.  (Transcript 2/7/07).  The hearing was noticed as a review hearing for post-termination proceedings, as well as a “section 45 hearing.”  Id.  The Court took up the issue of the review hearing first.  The Court heard testimony from the foster care worker and accepted into evidence the Adoption Progress Report.   Id.  At the review hearing, the question was raised as to whether the Court could terminate the jurisdiction of MCI due to failure to provide reasonable efforts toward permanency planning for Alyssa and Amber Keast.  Id., p. 97.  The Court requested briefs on that issue.  Id.  After reviewing the briefs, the Court issued an order terminating the guardianship of MCI and awarding custody of the two minor children to Tim and Barbara Atwood.  (Exhibit 9).  In this order, the Court found:
Reasonable efforts have not been made to finalize the court-approved permanency plan of adoption for Alyssa and Amber Keast.  Progress towards the children’s adoption was not made in a timely manner… Although the parental rights to the children were terminated and the children committed to the Department of Human Services for permanency planning, supervision, care and placement under MCL 400.203, by order dated May 10, 2006, as of the date of this review hearing virtually nothing has been done towards the adoption goal other than disapprove the grandparents and request the adoptive mother to reconsider…. [G]iven their ages and the length of time they have been in foster care reasonable efforts have not been made to place them for adoption in a timely manner.

	On April 13, 2007, DHS filed an emergency appeal with the Court of Appeals, which required the Atwoods to respond within four days.  (Exhibit 10 – Court of Appeals Docket 277354).  On April 17, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued a peremptory order reversing the decision.  (Exhibit 11).  The Atwoods filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration on May 8, 2007, which was denied on June 5, 2007.  (Exhibit 12).  The Atwoods filed an Application for Leave to Appeal to this Honorable Court, which was denied on September 10, 2007.  (Exhibit 13).
The trial court then continued the hearing on the Atwoods’ Motion pursuant to MCL 710.45 and heard their Motion for Grandparenting Time, pursuant to MCL 722.27b.  On June 21, 2007, the Court issued its Opinion Concerning the Withholding of Consent Conducted Pursuant to MCL 710.45.  (Exhibit 2).  In this Opinion, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed that the MCI superintendent’s denial of consent for the Atwoods to adopt the minor children was arbitrary and capricious.  On August 5, 2007, the trial court issued its Opinion and Order relative to Maternal Grandparents Motion for Visitation, wherein the court found it to be in the best interest of the minor children to have visitation with their grandparents.  (Exhibit 14).  The trial court also denied the motion of the foster mother, Nicole Coppess, to adopt the children (Exhibit 15) and consented to the adoption by the Atwoods.  (Exhibit 16).    
	On August 9, 2007, another emergency appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed in this matter, this time by the Foster Mother, who also filed a motion for a stay of proceedings.  (Docket No. 279820).  Without any chance once again for oral argument or a chance to argue against the granting of the application for leave to appeal or the emergency appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the Foster Mother’s request.  The order for grand-parenting time was stayed without any argument allowed by the Atwoods and without any showing of harm to the children or a basis for the stay.  
	The Department of Human Services filed a claim of appeal of the trial court’s decision regarding the Section 45 hearing in dockets 279834, 279844, and 279845 on August 8, 2007.  These three dockets were consolidated with Docket 279820 (the Foster Mother’s appeal of the grand-parenting time order).  
	On February 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued its Opinion and Order reversing the decisions of the trial court with regard to the Atwoods’ petition pursuant to MCL 710.45(2) and grand-parenting time.  (Exhibit 1).  The Atwoods filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on March 21, 2008.  (Exhibit 3).  The Court of Appeals released its Opinion and Order for publication on April 1, 2008.    

ARGUMENT
I.	THE DECISION OF THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT IN DENYING TIMOTHY AND BARBARA ATWOOD CONSENT TO ADOPT THEIR MINOR GRANDCHILDREN WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN THAT IT WAS BASED ON INVALID AND INACCURATE INFORMATION.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
	 The trial court reviews the decision of the MCI Superintendent for clear and convincing evidence that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.  MCL 710.45(7); In re Cotton, 208 Mich App 180, 184; 526 NW2d 342 (1994).  The appellate court reviews the decision of the trial court for clear error.  Boyd v Civil Service Comm.¸ 220 Mich App 226, 234; 559 NW2d 342 (1996).  Therefore, “when reviewing a lower court's review of agency action this Court must determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency's factual findings.”  Id.

B.  ANALYSIS

	After their petition for adoption was denied by the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) Superintendent, the Atwoods sought review of that decision pursuant to MCL 710.45, which provides:
(2) If an adoption petitioner has been unable to obtain the consent required by section 43(1)(b), (c), or (d) of this chapter, the petitioner may file a motion with the court alleging that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious. . . 
(7) Unless the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious, the court shall deny the motion described in subsection (2) and dismiss the petition to adopt.
(8) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious, the court shall issue a written decision and may terminate the rights of the appropriate court, child placing agency, or department and may enter further orders in accordance with this chapter or section 18 of chapter XIIA as the court considers appropriate. In addition, the court may grant to the petitioner reimbursement for petitioner's costs of preparing, filing, and arguing the motion alleging the withholding of consent was arbitrary and capricious, including a reasonable allowance for attorney fees.

Pursuant to this statute, the denial of consent cannot be arbitrary and capricious.  It must be based upon fact and supported by some indicia of reliability and evidence.  Simply not liking a candidate for adoption or having a bias against the candidate does not suffice as a basis for denial.  In re Carpenter, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided December 3, 1999 (Docket No. 217634) (Exhibit 15).  
The standard for articulating the arbitrary and capricious standard as set forth in In re Cotton, 208 Mich App 180, 184-185; 526 NW2d 601 (1994) is stated thusly:  “. .  the focus of such a hearing is not what reasons existed to authorize the adoption, but the reasons given by the representative for withholding the consent to adoption.  That is, if there exists good reasons why consent should be granted and good reasons why consent should be withheld, it cannot be said that the representative acted arbitrarily and capricious.”  (Emphasis added).    
	This language is important, because there must be good reason for the denial.  Indeed, where the MCI Superintendent relies upon a bad reason to deny consent to adopt, that denial is arbitrary and capricious.  In re Carpenter, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided December 3, 1999 (Docket No. 217634) (Exhibit 15).  In this case, the denial by the MCI Superintendent, Mr. Johnson, was based on faulty information and information that was not supplied to Mr. Johnson.  
The first reason presented in Superintendent Johnson’s “Consent to Adopt Decision” was that the Atwoods had allowed unsupervised visits between the children and their birth mother. (Exhibit A, p. 7).  Mr. Atwood testified that he did not know that his daughter was required to have supervised visitation.  The Atwoods were not told this until June 22, 2005, shortly before the children were removed from his care.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 41).  Mr. Atwood also testified that Brian Vanderzalm, in his capacity as a DHS caseworker, knew that the children’s mother lived in an apartment next door to the Atwood’s home, where DHS had placed the children.   (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 40).  Mr. Vanderzalm did not place any restrictions on when Erica Keast could see her children (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 41).  Mrs. Atwood also testified that she was never told that Ms. Keast’s visits with the children needed to be supervised and that she was never shown any court orders to that effect.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 113).
	Mr. Atwood testified that he had never been shown a copy of the Parent Agency Agreement (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 40).  Mrs. Atwood also testified that she had never seen it.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 113).  That document is not signed by either Mr. or Mrs. Atwood.  Mr. Vanderzalm admitted that he did not recall showing the Atwoods a copy of the Agreement (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 95).  Mr. Vanderzalm testified that he told the Atwoods that Ms. Keast was allowed to take the children to church unsupervised.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 95).  Dan Morgan, from Child Protective Services, told Mr. Atwood that the children’s mother could live with them and the children in their home.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 41).  Additionally, Mr. Atwood testified that he was not told that the mother’s boyfriend was not to have any contact with the children until after May 17, 2005.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 42-43).      
	Much has been made of Mr. Atwood’s admission to the Foster Care Review Board that he “knew” about the supervision restrictions.  He explained that statement in his testimony on May 23, 2007.  When Mr. Atwood was questioned if he knew that the visitations were to be supervised, he said yes.  However, he did not know that the Foster Care Review Board was referring to knowing about supervised visitation before the children were removed.  The Atwoods did come to learn that the visitation was to be supervised, but only after their grandchildren were removed from their care.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 57).  Therefore, at the time of the hearing on July 13, 2005, he knew about them.  That does not change the fact, however, that he did not know of those restrictions until Brian Vanderzalm told him about them on June 22, 2005.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 57).  
	The Court of Appeals cited an initial service plan that provided that unsupervised visitation was not allowed with the mother.  The service plan was never shared with the Atwoods and Mr. Vanderzalm could not verify at the hearing that he ever showed an Order, a Parent Agency Agreement or a service plan to the Atwoods.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 95).  The Atwoods were never noticed for any neglect hearings, so they were never privy to the Orders of the Court or the parenting time of Ms. Keast.
	Clearly, the Department of Human Services (DHS) did not clearly communicate its expectations to the Atwoods or show the Atwoods any Orders that would have made the Court’s intentions clear regarding supervised visitation of the mother with the children.  As a result, the Atwoods and their grandchildren are being punished.  The trial court properly found that the Appellees presented clear and convincing evidence that this was not a good reason for the MCI Superintendent to deny them consent.  The trial court found that the Atwoods were not informed as to their need to supervise the mother.  The trial court also found that the Atwoods were never given an opportunity to explain what happened, as even the foster care review board did not give them adequate notice.
	The second reason cited for the denial of consent to adopt was Mr. Atwood’s admission to smoking marijuana and his substance abuse history.  (Exhibit 1, p. 8).  Mr. Atwood has never been anything but forthcoming about his drug history, and he has been punished for his honesty.  Because of his admissions about drugs, Suzanne Adams of Bethany Christian Services asked Mr. Atwood to undergo a drug assessment and a psychological evaluation, both of which he did.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 52).  MCI Superintendent William Johnson testified that his statement in his denial of consent that Mr. Atwood ran a risk of relapse to substance abuse problems was not based on the substance abuse assessment.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 67).  The MCI Superintendent made up this conclusion.  Mr. Atwood testified that he only smoked marijuana with his daughter on March 7, 2005 and July 1, 2004, before DHS became involved in the case and when the children were not around.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 46). The Court of Appeals incorrectly characterized this testimony in its Opinion by stating that the children were in the home at that time.  (Exhibit 1, p. 10).  The trial court correctly found that clear and convincing evidence was presented that Superintendent Johnson’s belief that Mr. Atwood had judgment problems and risked relapse was arbitrary and capricious.  At the request of DHS, Mr. Atwood completed the substance abuse assessment that clearly states that Mr. Atwood is not at risk to use illegal substances.   While the Superintendent never interviewed the substance abuse evaluator or the psychologist that Mr. Atwood met with (or looked at the actual reports from either), the Court heard testimony from both of these experts.  
	For instance, Mr. Atwood met with Dr. Steve Griffioen, a licensed psychologist, at the request of Suzanne Adams of Bethany Christian Services.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 24-25).  Dr. Griffioen was asked to assess Mr. Atwood’s capacity to be a good parent, his tendencies to be cruel to animals or people, the possibility he’d expose his granddaughters to their other and potential addictive tendencies.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 25).  Dr. Griffioen testified that the tests he gave Mr. Atwood showed that “there [were] not any truly deep significant psychological problems going on.”  Transcript 2/7/07 p. 33).  The trial court also heard the testimony of Jackie Malsom, a social worker who conducts alcohol and drug assessments.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 44-45).  Mr. Atwood was referred to her for a drug and alcohol assessment by Bethany Christian Services.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 45).  Ms. Malsom testified that she did not find any evidence of current substance abuse with Mr. Atwood, nor did she find that he was at a high risk to engage in substance abuse.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 51).  Yet William Johnson did not review the reports of either of these individuals in making his decision to deny the Atwoods consent to adopt their grandchildren.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 67).                
	Interestingly enough, DHS, which technically still has custody and control over these children, made tragic mistakes that endangered these children every step of the way.   After removing the children because of unsupervised visitation and allegations of past drug use by Mr. Atwood, DHS returned the children to Erica Keast.  When they returned the children to Ms. Keast, she was living with her boyfriend and had just failed a drug test that had not never revealed to the trial court.  (Transcript 5/24/2007 p. 78).  Apparently, DHS had no problem returning the children to Ms. Keast while she was using drugs, had been convicted of drug trafficking and was living with a convicted drug felon,  but Mr. Atwood admitting to two occasions of past marijuana use was the basis for barring the Atwoods from the chance to adopt the same children.  The horrible judgment of DHS resulted in the children watch their mother overdose on prescription drugs and nearly die.  Only one week after placement with the mother and her boyfriend, DHS had to remove the children from their mother.   (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 71).  
The last purported reason for denying the Appellees consent to adopt their grandchildren was their “lack of insight” in “dealing effectively with the children’s mental health issues.”  (Exhibit 1, p. 8).  This conclusion came out of the blue and had absolutely no support in any mental health documentation or any reports from DHS.  William Johnson testified that he was unaware of whether Mr. or Mrs. Atwood tried to get counseling for the minor children while the children were placed with them. (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 68-69).  Mr. Atwood testified that he asked Dan Morgan if he could get appointments for the children to get counseling and that each child had a physical.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 59).  He stated that the older child, Alyssa, did have a counseling appointment while she was with them.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 59).  The evidence clearly showed that the Atwoods were caring grandparents who would put the needs of their grandchildren first.  Therefore, this “reason” for denial of consent was also based on inaccurate information, and the trial court properly found that clear and convincing evidence was presented that the MCI Superintendent’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The trial court did not decide the issue de novo, as the Appellees seemed to suggest, but simply gave each party a full opportunity to secure testimony and put their positions on the record for the Court to determine if there was “absence of any good reason to withhold consent.”  In re Cotton, 208 Mich App 180, 185, (1994).  The Court of Appeals agreed that this was the focus of the hearing in its analysis on page seven of the published opinion, by stating, “The initial focus of the hearing is on the reasons given for withholding consent to the adoption.  It is the absence of any good reason to withhold consent, rather than the presence of good reasons to grant it, which indicates that the decision maker acted arbitrarily and capriciously.” (Emphasis added, citation omitted).  The very language cited by the Court of Appeals recognizes the obligation of the trial court to determine if “good reason” exists for the denial.  This requires the trial court to review the evidence behind the decision of the MCI Superintendent and not just accept the reasons given as an absolute truth or “good.”  If the MCI Superintendent is not basing his/her reason for denial on factual documentation and evidence, but rather on conjecture and the slanted words of those preparing the reports, then the standard of “good reason” cannot be met.  Further, if the trial court serves no other purpose that to rubber stamp the decision of the MCI, then why must the initial focus of a section 45 hearing be on the reasons for withholding consent?   Does the Court have any role in determining if the reasons are valid, are based on evidence, on fact or reality?  If the Court has no role to hear the evidence behind the reasoning, then a section 45 hearing bears no purpose.
The trial court offered each party the complete and full opportunity to provide witnesses, briefs and evidence to determine if the MCI Superintendent made a decision based on “good reason.”  The Court listened to testimony of experts that Bethany Christian Services and DHS required the Atwoods to meet with.  The Court listened to the factual basis for Mr. Johnson’s denial and reviewed documentation that was offered.   In doing so, the trial court was in the best position to gauge the credibility of the witnesses.  Due regard should be given to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses that appear before it.  In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).  
Issues of credibility were of great importance in this matter as witnesses gave conflicting testimony.  The trial court was able to see and hear each witness in this matter as they testified before the court.  As such, the trial court was able to assign to each witness’s testimony the weight it deserved.  In contrast, the Court of Appeals pulled out snippets from the Foster Care Review Board Hearing (all second- and third-hand reported) to reverse the trial court.  The initial Foster Care Review Board meeting was at the request of the Atwoods, who were never given notice.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 44).  The Atwoods learned of the hearing while it was ongoing, after calling Lansing for the third time to establish when the hearing was scheduled.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 44).  When they arrived, they had no idea what had been discussed before they entered the room and had no opportunity to refute it or to answer to the allegations.  They had no opportunity to prepare or to have an attorney available to help them through the process.  In contrast, the trial court, at the time of the section 45 hearing, was given the full picture, from the Atwoods, the case-workers and the experts.  This Honorable Court should respect the weight assigned to the evidence by the trial court and uphold its decision. 	
	While the Court of Appeals accuses the trial court of substituting its own judgment on the denial of consent, the Court of Appeals based its reversal on evidence never reviewed by William Johnson or the trial court.  In the Court of Appeals’ Opinion, references are made to allegations made against the Atwoods by Erica Keast.  (Exhibit 1, p. 10).  Ms. Keast was never a witness who testified in the matter pending before this Court.  Mr. Johnson never met with Ms. Keast and no documentation was supplied to Mr. Johnson that referenced Ms. Keast.   Further, the credibility of Ms. Keast would be in serious question.  Ms. Keast was a known drug abuser, convicted of same and attempted to take her life due to such behavior.  Ms. Keast put her children at a risk of harm at every turn.  Ms. Keast also has a criminal history for falsely reporting a felony.  (Exhibit 17).  Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s reliance on evidence that was not part of the record before MCI to make its determination as to consent or before the trial court at the Section 45 hearing was clearly misplaced and demonstrates that it was the Court of Appeals reaching to substitute its judgment in this matter. 	
	The Court of Appeals also claimed that the trial court essentially made up the fact that the caseworkers were biased in this matter and were seeking another adoptive family.  The section 45 hearing was ripe with testimony of the adoption worker and the DHS worker constantly asking the foster mother to adopt, and the foster mother’s repeated denials to do so.  The testimony of the DHS worker was that from the time that the Atwoods requested adoption, the focus was on the foster mother, or anyone but the Atwoods.  The DHS caseworker, Lacey Gonzelez-Borstler, testified that she immediately attempted to recruit the foster mother into adopting the Keast children on her next home visit after the mother’s parental rights were terminated.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 55).  She stated that she wanted the foster mother to adopt the children, even though the foster mother wasn’t interested in adopting the children.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 57).  Ms. Gonzalez-Borstler even testified that she had several conversations with the adoption worker about the case and indicated that she thought that the foster mother should adopt the children, even though deciding who should adopt wasn’t her responsibility.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 58).  Further, the testimony of the adoption worker, Suzanne Adams, demonstrated the same bias.  Ms. Adams also asked the foster mother to adopt the Keast children multiple times.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 23).  She testified that the Keast children were never discussed with another family for adoption purposes.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 18).  She also testified that she could never remember a case where Bethany Christian Services had disagreed with DHS on an adoption.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 15-16).        
The trial judge made an important point at the end of his Opinion Concerning the Withholding of Consent Conducted Pursuant to MCL 710.45.  (Exhibit 2, p. 2).  He noted that William Johnson, as the MCI Superintendent, is the guardian of approximately 6,400 children in the State of Michigan.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 133).  To investigate consent packets, of which he receives approximately 2,700 to 2,800 a year, he only has the aid of two social workers and a clerk.  (Transcript 5/24/07 p. 132, 134).  Perhaps that’s why Superintendent Johnson testified that:
I received a packet of material from Bethany Christian Services, which is an agency under contract with DHS to provide adoption services.  The packet as I recall included a child adoption assessment of both children, it was completed by the agency; an adoptive family assessment of Mr. and Mrs. Keast (sic), was completed by the agency; copies of court orders and birth certificates of the children. I also received copies of a written rebuttal statement by Mr. and Mrs. Keast (sic) to the adoption assessment completed then by Bethany Christian Services, as well as I believe they included a couple of other references, what I call reference letters from person that were in support of their adoption.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 55, emphasis added).

	The MCI Superintendent did not even know the name of the prospective adoptive parents.  It is understandable given the case load and the number of children in his charge.  Given the lack of resources and the limited information that Mr. Johnson received, and the further conjecture on the part of Mr. Johnson, unsupported by documentation, it is apparent that Mr. Johnson’s denial was arbitrary and capricious.   The Court, after hearing directly from witnesses, seeing actual reports (not just a synopsis) and evaluating credibility reached the conclusion that MCI did not have “good reason” to deny consent.  
	
II.	THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER GRANDPARENT VISITATION PURSUANT TO MCL 722.27B.

A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

	This case involves issues of statutory interpretation.  The standard of review for issues involving statutory interpretation is de novo.  Herald Co., Inc v Eastern Michigan University Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 470, 719 NW2d 19 (2006).  

B.  ANALYSIS

The grandparent visitation statute, MCL 722.27b, clearly provides for specific situations when a grandparent has standing to request visitation.  That statute provides as follows:
(1) A child's grandparent may seek a grand-parenting time order under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(a) An action for divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment involving the child's parents is pending before the court.
(b) The child's parents are divorced, separated under a judgment of separate maintenance, or have had their marriage annulled.
(c) The child's parent who is a child of the grandparents is deceased.
(d) The child's parents have never been married, they are not residing in the same household, and paternity has been established by the completion of an acknowledgment of parentage under the acknowledgment of parentage act, 1996 PA 305, MCL 722.1001 to 722.1013, by an order of filiation entered under the paternity act, 1956 PA 205, MCL 722.711 to 722.730, or by a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction that the individual is the father of the child.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (13), legal custody of the child has been given to a person other than the child's parent, or the child is placed outside of and does not reside in the home of a parent.
(f) In the year preceding the commencement of an action under subsection (3) for grandparenting time, the grandparent provided an established custodial environment for the child as described in section 7, whether or not the grandparent had custody under a court order.

(Emphasis added).

Additionally, MCL 722.26(1) applies to the Child Custody Act, of which the grandparent visitation statute is a part, and provides that it must be liberally construed and applied.  Mason v Simmons, 267 Mich App 188, 194, 704 NW2d 104 (2005).  Specifically, MCL 722.26(1) provides, “This act is equitable in nature and shall be liberally construed and applied to establish promptly the rights of the child and the rights and duties of the parties involved.”
The Foster Mother contends that the Atwoods’ legal connection to the minor children has been severed.  The Child Custody Act, however, provides that a legal connection exists.  MCL 722.22(e) provides that a grandparent is defined as the “natural or adoptive parent of a child's natural or adoptive parent.”  As the Atwoods are the natural parents of the children’s natural mother, they have a legal connection under the grandparent visitation statute to request visitation with the minor children.  The statute clearly and unambiguously allows for grandparent visitation when the child’s parent no longer has legal custody of the child, or the child is placed outside of and does not reside in the home of a parent.  Either situation applied to the case before the trial court.  
The Foster Mother’s argument that when parental rights have been terminated, a child has no parents and therefore cannot be placed outside of the home of a parent is illogical.  If a child had no parents, all homes that child could be placed in would be outside of the home of a parent.  If the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute such as this one is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is unnecessary.  Institute of Basic Life Principles, Inc. v Watersmeet Twp, 217 Mich App 7, 12; 551 NW2d 199 (1996).  The Foster Mother is attempting to add further restrictions to the statute that were not expressed or intended by the Legislature.  The Court of Appeals has stated that, for purposes of the grandparent visitation statute, children are considered to be placed outside of the parents’ home in situations where the parents have “temporarily or permanently lost legal control over their children.”  Brinkley v Brinkley, 277 Mich App 23, 33; 742 NW2d 629 (2007) (emphasis added).  Notably, the Brinkley Court also noted that this type of situation involves “special circumstances where there are legitimate reasons for recognizing heightened protection of the grandparent-grandchild relationship.”  Id.  The minor children at issue are currently placed in a home outside of that of a parent; therefore, as their maternal grandparents, the Atwoods may be granted grand-parenting time pursuant to MCL 722.27b.  
The grandparent visitation statute does not contemplate that the termination of parental rights in an abuse or neglect action severs the grandparent relationship.  In fact, this is explicitly excluded by the grandparent visitation statute, which references adoption as an impediment to grand-parenting time (except in step-parent adoptions), but does not state that the termination of parental rights has the same result.  MCL 722.22(13).  Further, the grandparent visitation statute actually contemplates that grand parenting time can occur in neglect and abuse cases, as it references same under the best interest factors.
The willingness of the grandparent, except in the case of abuse or neglect, to encourage a close relationship between the child and the parent or parents of the child.  MCL 722.27b(6)(g).

The Foster Mother argued that the trial court committed clear error when it mentioned MCL 710.45(8) in its order granting the Atwoods’ motion for visitation.  This argument is unpersuasive.  The trial court stated that, “The court’s jurisdiction in this matter is conferred by MCL 710.45(8) and the order of the court determining Alyssa and Amber to be permanent wards of the court and by the grandparent visitation statute, MCL 722.27b…”  (Exhibit 1, p. 1).  By reference to MCL 710.45(8), the trial court referred to its prior termination of the rights of the Michigan Children’s Institute, which led to Alyssa and Amber being made wards of the court.  The trial court properly cited MCL 722.27b as the authority for its order relative to grandparent visitation.  	 

II.	THE CIRCUIT COURT’S DECISION THAT GRANDPARENT VISITATION WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN WAS APPROPRIATE.

A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

	Appellant Foster Mother asks this Court to review the trial court’s findings regarding the best interests of the children under the de novo standard of review, which is inappropriate.  This issue requires the review of the Circuit Court’s findings of fact, which are reviewed for clear error.  K & K Const., Inc. v Department of Environmental Quality, 267 Mich App 523, 543, 705 NW2d 365 (2005).  An appellate court will only disturb such findings where that appellate court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  Ambs v Kalamazoo Co. Rd. Comm., 255 Mich App 637, 652, 662 NW2d 424 (2003).

B.  ANALYSIS

	Pursuant to MCL 722.27b(6), the trial court properly considered the best interest of the minor children when awarding visitation to their grandparents.  The factors considered by the trial court were prescribed by the statute, including:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the grandparent and the child.
(b) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the grandparent, the role performed by the grandparent, and the existing emotional ties of the child to the grandparent.
(c) The grandparent's moral fitness.
(d) The grandparent's mental and physical health.
(e) The child's reasonable preference, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
(f) The effect on the child of hostility between the grandparent and the parent of the child.
(g) The willingness of the grandparent, except in the case of abuse or neglect, to encourage a close relationship between the child and the parent or parents of the child.
(h) Any history of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or neglect of any child by the grandparent.
(i) Whether the parent's decision to deny, or lack of an offer of, grandparenting time is related to the child's well-being or is for some other unrelated reason.
(j) Any other factor relevant to the physical and psychological well-being of the child.

Id.  Though the trial court may not have considered these best interest factors in the same order as the statute suggests, the trial court did consider each and every factor.  The evidence provided at the hearings on this issue supported the findings of fact reached by the trial court.
	The Foster Mother argues that, in its order, the trial court “misrepresented the testimony and failed to weigh unfavorable testimony” against the Atwoods.  (Foster Mother’s Application for Leave to Appeal, p. 17).  This statement is misleading and untrue.  Though Appellant Foster Mother argues that the trial court mischaracterized her testimony, she admits that she would have no further relationship with the minor children if their maternal grandparents adopted them.  (Transcript 8/3/07 p. 112).  She rebuffed the grandparent’s attempts through cards and cookies to establish a relationship that could result in the best interests of the children and continued contact with all the parties.  (Transcript 8/2/07 p. 205).  Therefore, the trial court correctly characterized her relationship with the children as all or nothing.  When compared with the Atwoods’ determination to pursue every option available to them to see their grandchildren, it is evident why the trial court would weigh the best interest factor concerning love and affection in the grandparents’ favor.      
	The Foster Mother complains that the trial court did not mention testimony she claims was presented in her favor.  Just because that testimony was not mentioned in the court’s opinion, however, does not mean that the court failed to consider the evidence.  Instead, it is evident that the trial court was not persuaded by the testimony offered.  Deference should be given to the trial court’s determination of witness credibility.  MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 267 Mich App 449, 459; 705 NW2d 144 (2005).  
	In arguing with the trial court’s determination as to the capacity and disposition of the parties to provide the children with food, clothing, and medical care, the Appellant Foster Mother argues only that this factor should weigh in her favor merely because her income is greater.  She does not point to any evidence that the Atwoods would be unable to provide their grandchildren with food, clothing or other care.  The Atwoods own their home and have lived there in excess of 25 years.  There was no testimony of financial difficulties and testimony revealed that throughout the lives of the children, the Atwoods provided for the needs of the children when the children lived with them.  Further, during the time period that visitations were allowed the foster mother provided absolutely no pajamas, blankets, stuffed animals or even a toothbrush for their visits.  (Transcript 8/2/07 p. 127).  The Atwoods bought all these supplies when the children came empty-handed.  Notably, the Appellant Foster Mother is unable to dispute the trial court’s finding that that both grandparents would be available for the children at all times, whereas she is a single woman who must work.  The trial court’s finding that the parties were equal as to this factor was appropriate.
	The trial court’s finding that the children had not experienced a lengthy stable environment was also appropriate.  Although the children have resided with the Foster Mother for two years, the children are aware that this was a foster environment, such as the others they had previously been in and removed from.  Additionally, for a considerable amount of time during these proceedings, the foster mother had refused to adopt the children, indicating that the relationship was not a permanent or stable one.  (Transcript 8/3/07 p. 90-91).  The reverse was true with the grandparents.  Testimony at the section 45 hearing revealed that the Atwoods had been in the lives of these children since birth.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 20-23; Transcript 8/2/07 p. 207).  The grandparents had provided a home for the mother and the children during the mother’s periods of instability.  (Transcript 5/23/07 p. 21-22).  The grandparents often cared for the children for extended periods of time when the mother would go on a hiatus.  The grandparents had provided the longest and most stable environment that the children had ever known.
	With regard to the moral fitness of the parties, the trial court considered the maternal grandfather’s past marijuana use, and did not minimize or discount it, as claimed by the Appellant Foster Mother.  The trial court correctly noted, however, that the grandfather underwent drug and alcohol screening, which indicated no addiction, present use or risk.  (Transcript 2/7/07 p. 51).  The drug and alcohol assessment was actually done at the request of Bethany Christian Services, but never given to MCI to review.  (Transcript 8/3/07 p. 27-28).  No evidence was presented to support Foster Mother’s argument that the children were ever exposed to marijuana use by their grandfather.  In fact, as stated by the trial court, the opposite is true.
	The Foster Mother discounts, however, the effect of her own actions on the minor children.  The foster mother’s own testimony revealed that in relationships with two different men (neither of which she was married to), she slept with the man, with the children in the same home or in the very same room.  (Transcript 8/3/07 p. 100-101).  The children often stayed at the homes of these men, because of convenience of the foster care mother.  (Transcript 8/3/07 p. 88).  Such young children should not be sleeping in the same room as an unmarried couple, whether or not that couple in engaging in sexual behavior at the time or not.  Additionally, the children are not even provided with beds when the foster mother takes them for overnight visits at the apartment of her boyfriend.  Testimony established that the children sleep on the floor, while the foster mother sleeps with her boyfriend on the fold-out futon.
	The Foster Mother offered extensive testimony about the regression of the children during the time of the grandparenting time.  None of the “experts” could say affirmatively what the regression was caused by.  All of the “experts” were co-workers and social friends of the foster-care mother.  (Transcript 8/2/07 p. 154).  Since they worked with the foster-care mother, they would hold impromptu meetings with her in the office and at social gatherings to discuss the progress of the children.  (Transcript 8/2/07 p. 167).  They did not keep notes of these discussions or provide any documentation.  It should be noted that the foster-care mother talked of all the problems that were related to the visitation.  However, she also told the children to call 911 if someone was hurting them, prior to sending them to visitation with the grandparents.  She refused to provide anything for the children to go to visitation – no pajamas, change of clothes, toothbrush, blanket or stuffed animal.  (Transcript 8/2/07 p. 127).
	Finally, the Foster Mother argued that the visitation time awarded to the grandparents in this case is too extensive, and that permanency for the minor children cannot be achieved as quickly if such visitation is allowed.  First, it should be noted that the visitation was designed to not infringe on the foster mother’s time with the children and primary was occurring when the foster care mother was working.  In lieu of daycare, the children would be with their grandparents.  The cost of daycare for the foster mother (or the state) would be eliminated and the children would continue in their relationship with their grandmother and grandfather.  
	The Foster Mother also ignores the fact that the trial court denied her petition for consent to adopt the minor children and granted consent to the Atwoods.  (Exhibits 15 and 16).  By arguing against visitation for the grandparents, she is the one postponing stability and permanency for the minor children.  MCL 722.27b(6) provides, “If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the child to enter a grandparenting time order, the court shall enter an order providing for reasonable grandparenting time of the child by the grandparent by general or specific terms and conditions.”  In light of the fact that the court has granted the Atwoods consent to adopt the minor children, the visitation that was ordered is reasonable to transition the children smoothly to their new environment.

CONCLUSION

	Appellants Tim and Barbara Atwood respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant their Application for Leave to Appeal, or in the alternative, enter an order preemptively reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the decision of the Newaygo County Circuit Court.
	Additionally, this Honorable Court should also order correction of the mistake of the Court of Appeals in listing the middle name of Amber Keast as Nicole instead of Marie.  (Exhibit 18).  Though this mistake was pointed out to the Court of Appeals in the Atwoods’ Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals released its opinion without correcting this error.
						Respectfully submitted, 
					            WILLIAMS, HUGHES & COOK, PLLC

Dated:  May 1, 2008.				By____________________________________
					   	    Shon A. Cook (P54512)
						    Susan M. Franklin (P66047)
					   	    Attorneys for Appellees Tim and Barbara Atwood